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123 S. Ct. 968 (2003)(mem.)
I. Introduction
In 1994,James Blake Colburn ("Colburn") was convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death.' On direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas, Colburn argued that under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments his
mental illness barred his execution.2 In his argument, Colburn relied on Ford v.
Wainnrigbt,3 which held that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits the State from
inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane."4 The Court of
Criminal Appeals stated that the issue of whether Colburn suffered from mental
illness at the time of trial or sentencing was not determinative of whether he
would be sane at the time of his execution.' The court instructed that the proper
time to make a claim that the defendant is not competent to be executed is when
execution becomes imminent.6 The court concluded that because Colburn's
execution was not imminent, his claim was not yet ripe.7 Additionally, the court
noted that the evidence to support this type of claim is best developed by a
hearing held as part of an application for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
court.
8
In 1999, Colburn filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 9 Colburn raised
the issue of his incompetence to stand trial."0 He did not, however, raise the
1. Colburn v. Texas, 966 S.W.2d 511, 512-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
2. Id. at 513. Colburn has a history of paranoid schizophrenia. Id.
3. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
4. Colbum, 966 S.W.2d at 513; see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (holding
that a state may not execute an insane prisoner). Seegeneral# Kimberly A. Orem, Case Note, 12
CAP. DEF.J. 191,197 (1999) (analyzing Swann v. Taylor, No. 98-20, 1999 WL 92435 (4th Cir. Feb.
18, 1999)).




9. See Colburn v. Cockrell, No. H-02-4180, at 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2002) (order denying
Colburn's Motion for a Stay of Execution).
10. Id. at1.
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issue of his incompetence to be executed." The district court denied his applica-
tion.
12
In May 2002, Colburn filed a second application for a writ of habeas
corpus.'3 Colburn alleged, as he had in state court, that his mental illness barred
his execution under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 4 The Southern
District of Texas denied Colburn's application and stated that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear his second petition for habeas relief.'" On appeal, Colburn
argued that his petition was not a true second petition because the court would
have dismissed any Ford claim made in his first petition on ripeness grounds. 6
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. 7
In 2002, Colburn filed a "Motion For Stay of Execution, Motion for
Appointment of Counsel, and Motion for Constitutionally Adequate Determina-
tion of Mr. Colburn's Present Competency to be Executed" in the district
court. 8 On November 6, 2002, the district court denied Colbum's motion for
a stay of execution and request for competency proceedings. 9 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed this denial.2 °
On November 6, 2002, the United States Supreme Court granted Colburn
a stay of execution pending the Court's grant of a writ of certiorari.2' On No-
vember 8, 2002, the Court directed Colburn to file a petition for a writ of certio-
rari. 2 On January 21, 2003, the Supreme Court denied Colbum's petition for a
writ of certiorari.23
11. Id. Court-appointed experts determined that at the time of Colbum's first petition for
habeas relief he was able to understand why he was being executed, and thus was not too insane
to be executed. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: A Conspirag Npped Can Sill Bring
Convidion, Jushces Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003, at A18.
12. See Co/burn, No. H-02-4180, at 3 (order noting that the district court denied Colbum's
initial habeas petition).
13. Telephone Interview with James Rytting, Attorney forJames Colbum (January 29,2003)
[hereinafter Telephone Interview with James Rytting].
14. Id.
15. Greenhouse, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Colbum v. Cockrell, 37 Fed. Appx. 90, 90 (5th Cir. 2002) (unpublished table decision).
18. Co/bun, No. H-02-4180, at 1.
19. Id. at4.
20. Colbum v. Cockrell, No. 02-21208, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24777, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov.
6, 2002).
21. Colburn v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 516, 516 (2002) (mem.).
22. Colbum v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 517, 517 (2002) (mem.).




In Ford, the Court set forth the constitutional principle that an insane
individual may not be executed. 4 In Stewart v. MartineZ<-Villareal,2s the Court held
that if a petitioner makes a Ford claim in his first habeas petition, then a second
petition that presents a Ford claim should not be considered successive under
2244(b)(3). 6 In a case such as Colburn's, in which the petitioner does not meet
the incompetency standard at the time of the first habeas petition, and subse-
quently may meet the standard, the Court has not addressed the proper means
by which such a petitioner should exercise the protection provided by Ford.
The Supreme Court, by denying review of Colbum's claim, has left in place
the construction by the Southern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit of the
AEDPA ban on successive petitions. 2' The Fifth Circuit's analysis creates a
"fatal conundrum" for all petitioners who are not too incompetent to be exe-
cuted when they file their first habeas petitions, and thus do not raise the Ford
issue.2" When such a petitioner does become too incompetent to be executed,
there is no procedural mechanism for him to make this claim.
This conundrum is created partially by AEDPA's timing requirements. 9
Section 2244(d)(1) sets forth a one year statute of limitation for applications for
habeas relief.3" Because of § 2244(d)(1), counsel cannot delay filing an applica-
tion for habeas relief until his client has become too incompetent to be
executed."
In order to protect a defendant who may become too incompetent to be
executed, but who does not meet the standard of incompetence within the
24. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. In Ford, the Court concluded that states are prohibited from
inflicting the death penalty on prisoners who are insane. Id. The Court discussed this prohibition
using the term "insane." Id. It also, however, described the state's obligation to determine a
prisoner's "competence to be executed." Id. at 418. In its conclusion, the Court set forth the
general standard for whether a prisoner is competent to be executed by stating that "[i]t is no less
abhorrent today than it has been for centuries to exact in penance the life of one whose mentalillness
prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the penaly or its implications." Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
25. 523 U.S. 637 (1998).
26. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1998) (holding that if a first habeas
petition raises a Fordclaim, then a second petition raising the issue is not successive); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(A) (2000) (stating that before a district court may hear a second or successive petition,
the court of appeals must grant the applicant an order authorizing the district court to consider the
petition).
27. See Colburn, 37 Fed. Appx. at 90 (affirming the district court's denial).
28. See Greenhouse, supra note 11 (describing Colburn's case and discussing the issue of
whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider a claim of mental incompetency).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000) (setting forth a one year statute of limitation for an
application for a writ of habeas corpus; part of AEDPA).
30. Id.
31. See id. (stating the statute of limitations).
2003]
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statute of limitation, counsel has three alternatives. First, if counsel foresees any
future likelihood of the defendant becoming too incompetent to be executed,
counsel may choose to make a Fordclaim in the first habeas petition.32 The court
may determine that the issue is not ripe at the time of the first petition. How-
ever, under Stewart, a second petition would not be successive, and the court may
reconsider the issue when execution becomes imminent.33
Second, counsel may file a Motion to Reserve Judgment on the Issue of
Incompetence to Be Executed with the first habeas petition. Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to enter a final judgment on less
than all of a party's claims.' The court, as soon as execution becomes imminent,
may then issue a final judgment as to whether the defendant is competent to be
executed.3" By filing this motion, counsel avoids the bar on successive habeas
petitions and ensures that the court will consider the defendant's Ford claim when
it is ripe. This motion does not inhibit the defendant's ability to appeal on other
grounds because the court's final judgment on the remaining issues constitutes
a final decision that is appealable under § 1291.'
Finally, counsel may seek clemency for his client.37 In 1999, then-Governor
James Gilmore granted clemency to Calvin Swann.3" Swann suffered from severe
schizophrenia and his attorneys "contended [that] he was too mentally ill to
understand either his crime or the impending punishment."3 9  Clemency is
discretionary and occurs infrequently; counsel should not depend upon it as a
reliable means of protecting the incompetent defendant from execution.'
V. Condu~ion
In Ford and Stewart, the Supreme Court granted protection from execution
for those persons deemed too incompetent or insane to be executed.4 By
32. Telephone Interview with James Rytting, Vpra note 13.
33. See Stewart, 523 U.S. at 642-44 (holding that if a first habeas petition raises a Ford claim,
then a second petition raising the issue will not be considered successive).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
35. Seegeneral# id. (permitting a court to enter a final judgment on less than all of a party's
claims).
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (granting jurisdiction to the courts of appeals for all final
decisions from the district courts).
37. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-229 (Michie 2002) (vesting power to commute capital
punishment and grant pardons in the Governor).
38. Donald P. Baker, Gilmore Stops ExecwtionforFirst Time; Mental Iliess of Inmate Cited, WASH.
POST, May 13, 1999, at Al.
39. Id.
40. Id, Before granting Swann clemency, Gilmore allowed twenty-one state-conducted
executions to proceed. Id.
41. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410 (stating that an insane person may not be executed); Stewart, 523
U.S. at 639 (upholding the principle set forth in Ford). But see Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018,
1027 (8th Cir. 2003). In 1979, Charles Singleton ("Singleton") was convicted of capital felony
[Vol. 15:2
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denying review of Colburn's petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court
has chosen not to fill a gap in this protection. Counsel should be aware of this
gap and its relationship with AEDPA's ban on successive habeas petitions. On
behalf of their client, counsel must take all measures necessary to avoid default-
ing this issue.
Kristen F. Grunewald
murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 1020. Singleton suffered from psychosis, but conceded that
antipsychotic medication restored him to competency. Id. at 1021-22. In 1992, Singleton termi-
nated his antipsychotic treatment. Id. at 1021. The State of Arkansas began to medicate Singleton
involuntarily in 1997. Id. On appeal from the district court's denial of Singleton's application for
habeas relief, Singleton argued to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that
involuntarily administered medication violated his Eighth Amendment rights once his execution
date was set because it was no longer in his best medical interest. Id. at 1023. The Eighth Circuit
held that "[a] State does not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Fordwhen it executes
a prisoner who became incompetent during his long stay on death row but who subsequently
regained competency through appropriate medical care." Id. at 1027.
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